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Hancor, Inc. v. Mollewood Export, Inc.

No. 91156211 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2005)
Hancor, Inc. v. Mollewood Export, Inc.

9 Cited authorities

  1. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.

    477 U.S. 242 (1986)   Cited 241,300 times   39 Legal Analyses
    Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

  2. Sweats Fashions v. Pannill Knitting Co.

    833 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 163 times
    Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."

  3. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 190 times   32 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

  4. Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc.

    739 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that the nonmovant "must set out, usually in an affidavit by one with knowledge of specific facts, what specific evidence could be offered at trial."

  5. Opryland USA v. Great American Music Show

    970 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 24 times
    In Opryland, Opryland USA opposed the registration of "THE CAROLINA OPRY," arguing that the term was confusingly similar to Opryland's own marks.

  6. Lloyd's Food Products, Inc. v. Eli's, Inc.

    987 F.2d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that third-party evidence should not be disregarded in evaluating the strength of a mark for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion

  7. Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.

    951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”

  8. Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's, Inc.

    961 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"

  9. Rule 56 - Summary Judgment

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56   Cited 336,252 times   161 Legal Analyses
    Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit