Gregory Bleck et al.

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,574 times   189 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.

    566 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 259 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that inventor's unwitnessed notebook was not adequate corroborating evidence of an earlier invention date
  3. Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.

    774 F.2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 459 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that “obviousness is determined entirely with reference to a hypothetical ‘person having ordinary skill in the art’ ” and the “actual inventor's skill is irrelevant” to the obviousness inquiry
  4. Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's

    533 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 107 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding a chemical compound non-obvious where the invention at issue replaced a more lipophilic substituent with a less lipophilic substituent in contravention of the prior art's teaching that lipophilicity at a particular position on a ring structure conferred beneficial results
  5. Daiichi Sankyo v. Matrix Lab

    619 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 35 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Affirming district court's finding that asserted claims were not obvious under structural obviousness analysis because defendant failed to demonstrate POSA would have chosen compounds as lead compounds
  6. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"
  7. Application of Wright

    569 F.2d 1124 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 27 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-677. March 31, 1977. Joseph T. Eisele, John Kurucz, Kane, Dalsimer, Kane, Sullivan Kurucz, New York City, attorneys of record for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of Counsel. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of United States Patent Office. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and HERBERT N. MALETZ, Associate Judge, United States Customs Court. MILLER, Judge. This appeal

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.142 - Requirement for restriction

    37 C.F.R. § 1.142   Cited 25 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Discussing requirement for restriction
  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)