Global Total Office

12 Cited authorities

  1. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.

    615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1980)   Cited 394 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that there was no evidence of intent because even though the junior user was aware of Domino sugar, he was simply shortening the prior name of the restaurant
  2. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 190 times   32 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  3. In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc.

    105 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that DELTA is the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA CAFÉ where the disclaimed word CAFÉ is descriptive of applicant's restaurant services
  4. Octocom Systems v. Houston Computer Services

    918 F.2d 937 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 28 times

    No. 90-1196. November 2, 1990. Brian M. Dingman, Law Offices of Joseph S. Iandiorio, Waltham, Mass., argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Joseph S. Iandiorio. J. Paul Williamson, Arnold, White Durkee, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before NIES, Chief Judge, ARCHER and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges. NIES, Chief Judge. Octocom Systems, Inc. (OSI), appeals from the final decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark

  5. Weiss Associates, Inc. v. HRL Associates, Inc.

    902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 21 times
    Affirming denial of registration of "TMM" mark for software because: it was likely to be confused with a registered mark "TMS," also used for software; "[t]he marks sound alike and look alike; and "[t]he products are very similar and directly compete."
  6. Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank

    811 F.2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 13 times
    Affirming likelihood of confusion
  7. TBC Corp. v. Holsa, Inc.

    126 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    No. 96-1140 DECIDED: October 9, 1997 Appealed from: Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. (Opposition No. 84,567) Marsha G. Gentner, Jacobson, Price, Holman Stern, P.L.L.C., of Washington, D.C., argued for appellant. With her on the brief was Leesa N. Weiss. William R. Golden, Jr., of Kelley Drye Warren, of New York, New York, argued for appellee. Before RICH, NEWMAN, and RADER, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RICH. Circuit Judge RADER dissents

  8. In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc.

    837 F.2d 463 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between furniture and "general merchandise store services," and rejecting the distinction between goods and services as having "little or no legal significance"
  9. Wella Corp. v. California Concept Corp.

    558 F.2d 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 9 times

    Patent Appeal No. 77-503. July 14, 1977. Frank P. Presta, Jacobi, Lilling Siegel, Arlington, Va., for the Wella Corp. Gary E. Lande, Poms, Smith, Lande Glenny, Los Angeles, Cal., for California Concept Corp. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. MILLER Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("board"), 192 USPQ 158 (1976), dismissing appellant's opposition No. 55,727, filed June 6, 1974, against application No. 454,056, filed April 20, 1973, for

  10. Grandpa Pidgeon's, Missouri v. Borgsmiller

    477 F.2d 586 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that two pictures of an elderly man created a similar commercial impression and were, therefore, likely to cause confusion
  11. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,600 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  12. Section 1126 - International conventions

    15 U.S.C. § 1126   Cited 185 times   29 Legal Analyses
    Stating that an application under § 44 "must state the applicant's bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, but use in commerce shall not be required prior to registration"