Georgia Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Personhood USA, Inc.

28 Cited authorities

  1. Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC

    668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 109 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
  2. Sweats Fashions v. Pannill Knitting Co.

    833 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 163 times
    Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
  3. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 194 times   33 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  4. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 76 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
  5. National Cable Television v. Am. Cinema

    937 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 83 times
    Rejecting contention that “American Cinema Editors” did not have trademark rights in the acronym “ACE”
  6. In re Cordua Rests., Inc.

    823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 30 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that certain words referring to key aspects of a genus of services were generic for those services
  7. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice

    710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 89 times
    Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them
  8. Herbko Intern., Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.

    308 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 47 times
    Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)
  9. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP

    746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 26 times
    Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services
  10. In re Nat. Data Corp.

    753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 74 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
  11. Section 1125 - False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden

    15 U.S.C. § 1125   Cited 15,944 times   330 Legal Analyses
    Holding "the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional"
  12. Section 2 - Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty

    15 U.S.C. § 2   Cited 4,505 times   31 Legal Analyses
    In § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities.
  13. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,616 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  14. Section 1057 - Certificates of registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1057   Cited 1,056 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark
  15. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"
  16. Section 2.106 - Answer

    37 C.F.R. § 2.106   Cited 12 times
    Defining compulsory counterclaim as "defense attacking the validity of any one or more of the registrations pleaded in the opposition"