Frito-Lay North America, Inc. v. Princeton Vanguard, LLC

16 Cited authorities

Permanent v. Lasting
543 U.S. 111 (2004) Cited 336 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding defense available even where likelihood of confusion established
In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp.
240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) Cited 38 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that 1–888–M–A–T–T–R–E–S–S “immediately conveys the impressions that a service relating to mattresses is available by calling the telephone number”
In re Hotels.com
573 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) Cited 24 times 4 Legal Analyses
Finding that the TTAB did not err in determining that the term was generic, citing in part concerns arising from the methodology of the applicant's consumer survey
E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co. v. Yoshida Int'l.
393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) Cited 83 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding that survey results indicating that 68% of consumers viewed Teflon as a brand name rebutted the claim that the mark was generic
Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982) Cited 58 times
Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
In re Nett Designs, Inc.
236 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) Cited 28 times
Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"
H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Ass'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc.
782 F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986) Cited 47 times 8 Legal Analyses
Reversing decision of TTAB that "Fire Chief," as applied to monthly magazine circulated to fire departments, was generic
Ayer v. United States
902 F.2d 1038 (1st Cir. 1990) Cited 35 times
Holding that Air Force decision not to include safety railings in missile launch control chamber fell within the discretionary function exception
In re the American Fertility Society
188 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 23 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that an earlier precedential decision is binding precedent on later panels
Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc.
940 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 33 times 2 Legal Analyses
Explaining that the Lanham Act is clear "that the relevant public for a genericness determination is the purchasing or consuming public"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 24 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Frito-Lay North America, Inc. v. Princeton Vanguard, LLC

16 Cited authorities

Holding defense available even where likelihood of confusion established

Holding that 1–888–M–A–T–T–R–E–S–S “immediately conveys the impressions that a service relating to mattresses is available by calling the telephone number”

Finding that the TTAB did not err in determining that the term was generic, citing in part concerns arising from the methodology of the applicant's consumer survey

Finding that survey results indicating that 68% of consumers viewed Teflon as a brand name rebutted the claim that the mark was generic

Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"

Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"

Reversing decision of TTAB that "Fire Chief," as applied to monthly magazine circulated to fire departments, was generic

Holding that Air Force decision not to include safety railings in missile launch control chamber fell within the discretionary function exception

Holding that an earlier precedential decision is binding precedent on later panels

Explaining that the Lanham Act is clear "that the relevant public for a genericness determination is the purchasing or consuming public"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"