For Life Products, LLC

14 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 188 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  2. Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin

    396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 72 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
  3. In re Bayer

    488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 39 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
  4. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP

    746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 24 times
    Reviewing the weight given to the similarity-of-the-marks factor for legal error
  5. In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States

    675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 8 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor

  6. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.

    315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
  7. Application of Abcor Development Corp.

    588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 36 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
  8. In re Gyulay

    820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
  9. Federated Foods v. Fort Howard Paper Co.

    544 F.2d 1098 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 16 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the mere existence of modern supermarket containing wide variety or products should not foreclose further inquiry into the likelihood of confusion arising from the use of similar marks on any goods so displayed
  10. Krim-Ko v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y

    390 F.2d 728 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 7 times
    Holding with coined words which are meaningless so far as the English language is concerned, slight variations in spelling or arrangement of letters are often insufficient to direct the buyer's attention to the distinction between marks.
  11. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,806 times   124 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,585 times   272 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  13. Section 2.41 - Proof of distinctiveness under section 2(f)

    37 C.F.R. § 2.41   Cited 11 times   4 Legal Analyses

    (a)For a trademark or service mark - (1)Ownership of prior registration(s). In appropriate cases, ownership of one or more active prior registrations on the Principal Register or under the Trademark Act of 1905 of the same mark may be accepted as prima facie evidence of distinctiveness if the goods or services are sufficiently similar to the goods or services in the application; however, further evidence may be required. (2)Five years substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce. In appropriate