Following its June 9, 2010 final orders, the Agency filed timely appeals which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). On appeal, the Agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of an EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) award of attorney's fees in connection with her finding of discrimination in these cases in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 206(d) et seq. Specifically, the Agency argues that the AJ's findings with regard to Complainants' fee petition were arbitrary and capricious and misapplied the law. BACKGROUND During the period at issue, both Complainants worked as Country Program Directors at the Agency's International Programs Office in Washington, D.C. On June 1, 2000, Complainant Jacobsen ("Complainant 1") filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of national origin (Puerto Rican), sex (female), and in reprisal for prior protected activity when: 1. The Agency lowered Complainant 1's performance assessment from a high level to a medium level; 2. Complainant I did not receive a contribution rating increase or contribution award; and 3. Complainant 1's workload increased and she was not offered adequate assistance. Complainant I amended her formal complaint on April 25, 2002, to add the allegation that: 4. Complainant I was subject to wage-based discrimination and performed the same type of work and received less pay than male workers. On August 2, 2000, Complainant Taft ("Complainant 2") filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex and age (53) when: 1. Complainant 2 was rated below the level she expected on her performance appraisal and was denied a contribution rating increase and contribution award; 2. Complainant 2 was paid less than some male counterparts for equal work; and 3. The Agency did not acknowledge or compensate Complainant 2 for receiving a letter of appreciation from the Department of State. At the conclusion of the investigations, the Agency provided Complainants with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of their right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainants timely requested a hearing and the AJ assigned to Complainant 1's case held a hearing on April 28, 2003. The AJ issued a decision on December 20, 2004, finding no discrimination. On December 21, 2004, the AJ assigned to Complainant 2's case dismissed Claim 1 on the grounds of untimely EEO counselor contact, Claim 2 as precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and Claim 3 for failure to state a claim. As to Claim 2, the AJ concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel required applying the adverse finding in Complainant 1's case against Complainant 2. Both Complainants appealed. In EEOC Appeal No. 0120052957 (December 21, 2006), we addressed Complainant 1's appeal. The Commission affirmed the AJ's findings with respect to Claims 1-3. However, the Commission vacated the AJ's findings with respect to Claims 4. Specifically, the Commission found the AJ incorrectly concluded that "'bureaucratic inertia' is a valid defense to Complainant's [Equal Pay Act (EPA)] claim." We further found that "there is ample evidence that the agency was not merely asleep at the bureaucratic wheel, but was aware of the fact that complainant was doing work equal to the work male Level IV employees were doing but was being paid less." Accordingly, we remanded Claim 4 for a hearing to determine whether the wage differential was based on a factor other than sex. In EEOC Appeal No. 0120053131 (December 21, 2006), the Commission affirmed the AJ's findings with regard to Complainant 2's first and third claims. However, the Commission found that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply to Complainant 2 because she was not a party to Complainant 1's proceedings. Accordingly, we remanded the matter to the Agency for a hearing on the merits. Subsequently, the two remanded claims were assigned to a different AJ. That AJ issued an order on January 4, 2008, consolidating the remanded matters for a hearing, and held a hearing on February 12-14, 2008. Both Complainants were represented by the same attorney. On May 27, 2010, the AJ issued separate final decisions concluding the Agency had subjected Complainants to discrimination based on sex as alleged under both Title Vll and the EPA. As a result, the AJ awarded each Complainant a retroactive promotion, as well as liquidated damages and back pay for three years. In addition, the AJ reviewed Complainants' Consolidated Verified Petition for Attorney Fees and Costs ("Fee Petition") and found that an award of attorney's fees was warranted. Complainants' attorney requested a total of $696,756.00 (plus an additional $13,787.42 in costs) with regard to efforts expended on behalf of Complainant I, and $479,275.50 (plus an additional $8,947.42 in costs) for efforts expended on behalf of Complainant 2. As an initial matter, the AJ accepted counsel's hourly rate of $465 as reasonable pursuant to the "Laffey Matrix."2 Neither party has disputed the AJ's determination of counsel's hourly rate. The AJ did not dispute the Agency's contention that Complainants' attorney's fees should be reduced because attorney's fees are not available under the EPA. However, the AJ did not agree with a 50% reduction because she determined that Complainants' EPA and Title VII claims were closely aligned and not easily separated. Instead, the AJ ordered a 10% reduction to account for counsel's efforts on EPA matters. In addition, the AJ reduced counsel's request for both Complainants by 10% for work spent on unsuccessful claims, 10% for excessive and redundant fees, and 5% for clerical work performed by the attorney. With regard to Complainant 1's matters, the AJ further disallowed 100 hours for clerical and technical tasks performed in preparation of the fee petition and 29.1 hours from counsel's efforts on behalf of Complainant 1's unsuccessful Motion for Reconsideration on behalf of Complainant 1. Similarly, the AJ disallowed 100 hours for the preparation of the Fee Petition on behalf of Complainant 2. Ultimately, the AJ awarded $409,320.90 in fees associated with Complainant 1's claims, a 41.25% reduction from counsel's request, and $288,279.07 in fees associated with Complainant 2's claims, a 39.85% reduction. The AJ also found Complainants' counsel properly documented his costs and expenses, but reduced his request by 10% for costs and expenses associated with Complainants' EPA matters. Accordingly, the AJ awarded $12,840.52 and $8,436.04 for Complainant 1's and Complainant 2's claims, respectively. The Agency subsequently issued final orders accepting the AJ's findings of discrimination and remedial orders. However, the Agency rejected the AJ's award of attorney's fees and costs, and on this matter appeals. In its final orders, the Agency said that it "will pay the amount deemed justified." CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL In its arguments on appeal, the Agency acknowledges that the records support the AJ's findings that Complainants suffered sex-based wage discrimination, and that the AJ properly awarded liquidated damages and back pay. The Agency solely argues that the AJ's award of attorney's fees was arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with the law. The Agency asserts that the records demonstrate that at least 50% of work performed by Complainants' counsel was dedicated to EPA matters. The EPA contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that is inapplicable to claims brought at the administrative level, as acknowledged by the Commission in Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 11-1 (November 9, 1999). The Agency argues that the EPA and Title VII involve vastly different procedural requirements, remedies, and burdens of proof. Therefore, "attorney time spent pursuing elements relevant to the Complainants' EPA claims, which were irrelevant to their Title VII claims, is unrecoverable." Complainants' counsel's failure to segregate the time spent on EPA issues from time spent on Title VII issues requires reducing the Fee Petition in half (by 50%). The Agency highlights several examples in arguing that a 10% reduction for excessive and duplicative fees was insufficient. The Agency argues that a 20% deduction is warranted. With regard to Complainants' Opposition to Agency Motion for Summary Judgment, the Agency notes that the facts and analysis sections of both briefs are identical. The Agency asserts, however, that Complainants' counsel billed over 70 hours for Complainant 2 and over 125 hours for Complainant 1, even though the brief filed on behalf of Complainant 1 was taken in large part from the brief filed on behalf of Complainant 2. The Agency further notes that Complainants' that counsel claimed approximately 141 hours of work to prepare Complainant 1's brief appealing the December 20, 2004 decision finding no discrimination. To put this in perspective, 141 hours is the equivalent of almost 4 weeks' worth of 8-hour workdays. The Agency argues that an "experienced attorney (demanding the highest Laffby rate) should not" require this much time to prepare an appellate brief, especially since the Fee Petition reflects that counsel had performed extensive legal research and was intimately familiar with all aspects of the case. While counsel claimed 58.7 hours of work associated with Complainant 2's appeal, the Agency argues that the appeal was identical to that filed in Complainant 1's case, except for a single page dedicated to collateral estoppel. Moreover, the Agency argues that the Fee Petition contains a total of 424.6 hours dedicated to the preparation of the Fee Petition. In presenting the petition, counsel wrote off 122 hours, requesting compensation for 302.6 hours. The Agency argues that the AJ properly deducted 100 hours, but that the AJ should have deducted even more because the Fee Petition contained information that was readily available and should have been easily assembled. Regarding the discovery and hearing phase for both Complainants, the Fee Petition requested a total of 94.4 hours for the investigative phase, 243.9 hours for the discovery phase, 312.8 hours for the first hearing, and 266.9 hours for the second hearing. In doing so, the Agency argues that counsel "researched the same case law, reviewed the same documents, interviewed the same witnesses, and analyzed the same facts in each phase of the litigation." The Agency's argument continues in a similar vein with regards to other instances. For example, the Agency notes 29.5 hours for the first prehearing statement and 43.9 hours for the second prehearing statement even though both statements used factual statements derived from earlier filings; 78.9 hours for a brief on back pay that incorporated previously available information and legal research; 111 hours for back pay award analysis performed in conjunction with settlement discussions; 123.3 hours for a written closing argument subsequent to the first hearing; 126.8 hours for a written closing argument; and 72.6 for a rebuttal statement submitted subsequent to the second hearing. According to the Agency's calculations, counsel is entitled to 5217,148.11 on behalf of Complainant 1, and $154,517.44 on behalf of Complainant 2. Complainants' counsel submitted several briefs on appeal. In Appellants' Notices of Breach and Petitions for Enforcement and for Clarification, counsel argues that the Agency has failed to implement the remedies that it accepted in its July 9, 2010, final orders. Subsequent to this filing, counsel also filed a Supplemental Notice of Breach, Petition for Enforcement and for Clarification; a Notice of Continuing Non-Compliance and of Additional Legal Authority in Support of Petition for Enforcement; and a Fourth Supplemental Notice of [Agency's] Continuing Breach and Non-Compliance In Support of Their Petitions for Enforcement and for Clarification. In the 228-page Appellants' Consolidated Brief and Statement in Opposition to the Agency's Appeal, Complainants' counsel again argues the Agency has failed to provide interim relief, and requests that we dismiss the appeal. Complainants argue that Commission precedent provides that EPA violations are per se violations of Title VII. Therefore, Complainants are entitled to their full complement of reasonable attorneys' fees. Complainants' counsel contends the Agency has failed to provide any evidence to support its arguments on appeal. Counsel argues that the Agency's arguments are conclusory and without foundation; the Agency's arguments are mere estimates and speculations. Counsel cites several Commission cases in arguing that simply terming a fee petition "redundant," "duplicative," "unnecessary," or "excessive" is legally insufficient. Counsel states that, "[a]lthough complaining that the time spent was excessive, the [Agency] never challenged specific time entries as required, which are well documented." Complainants' counsel in attempting to distinguish cases supporting the Agency's position, arguing that the referenced cases involve situations where the attorneys presented insufficient documentation to support their fee petitions. Further, Counsel argues that the record does not support the Agency's arguments that the Fee Petition contains duplicative and excessive billing. Counsel details the efforts necessary to prepare filings on behalf of both Complainants, arguing that the hours billed were justified and reasonable, and rejecting the Agency's argument that he prepared identical briefs. For example, Counsel insists that the fact statements to the Opposition to Summary Judgment for each Complainant were substantially different in context and length and the hearings for each Complainant involved different witnesses and arguments, contrary to the Agency's appellate argument. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As the Agency accepted all portions of the AJ's findings and remedial awards with the exception of the award of attorney's fees, we confine our discussion to whether the AJ appropriately awarded attorney's fees.3 EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501 provides for an award of attorney fees and costs to a successful Title VII litigant in accordance with existing case law and regulatory standards. The starting point for determining the amount of an award of reasonable attorney fees is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983). Additional consideration, however, may lead to an adjustment of the fee award upward or downward, "including the important factor of the 'results obtained."' Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). In cases involving "a common core of facts" or based on related legal theories, much of an attorney's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. In such cases, the focus should be on the significance of the overall relief obtained in relation to the hours reasonably expended. Id. The First Circuit in Coutin v. Youna & Rubicam, 124 F.3d 331, 337 (1st Cir. 1997), a case cited by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Management Directive (MD)-l 10 for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (Nov. 9, 1999), provides guidance as to the appropriate standard of review for an AJ's determination of attorney's fees: We review fee awards deferentially, according substantial respect to the trial court's informed discretion. See Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 492 (1st Cir. 1993). We will disturb such an award only for mistake of law or abuse of discretion. See United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1988). In this regard, an abuse of discretion occurs "when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them." Foster v. Mvdas Assocs., Inc., 943 F.2d 139, 143 (1st Cir. 1991) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], 124 F.3d at 336. Therefore, in this appeal, the Commission will determine if the AJ made a mistake as a matter of law or abused her discretion. Hourly Rate Neither party disputed counsel's request for an hourly rate of $465 in accordance with the Laffey Matrix. Thus, we do not address that part of the award. Reduction for Equal Pay Act Efforts In the instant case, Complainants successfully argued they suffered wage discrimination in violation of the EPA and Title VII. However, the EPA does not permit attorney's fees at the administrative level. Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (MD-110), at 11-1 (November 9, 1999). Thus, the AJ reduced the Fee Petition by 10% based on her observation that Complainants' EPA and Title VII claims were so intertwined that separation was virtually impossible. Complainants' successful claim, that they were subjected to sex-based wage discrimination, is equally prohibited by Title VII and the EPA. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain whether Complainants' success is due to the prohibitions put in place by Title VII or by the EPA's proscriptions. At the same time, a review of the record shows that Complainant's counsel devoted significant time to arguing the Agency violated the EPA. For example, the Opposition to the Agency's Motion for Summary Judgment in Complainant 2's case focuses almost exclusively on the EPA and makes but a cursory reference to Title VII. As to Complainant 1's opposition, counsel provides more focus to a Title VII argument, but the focus appears squarely upon establishing an EPA claim. Further, Complainant 1's appeal and our decision in EEOC Appeal No. 0120052957 focused exclusively on whether the AJ improperly found the Agency asserted a valid defense under the EPA. Complainant 2's appeal follows a similar track with the exception that Complainant 2 had to defeat an AJ decision that her claim was collaterally estopped as a result of the decision in Complainant 1's case. Notably, Complainant 1 filed a brief entitled, "Brief on the Scope of Back Pay That Should Be Awarded For An Equal Pay Act (and Title VII) Violations." The inclusion of Title VII in parentheses, as supported by the contents of the brief, indicates that the primary focus of Complainant 1's efforts was on EPA violations, not Title VII. As noted in Complainants' Pre-Hearing Conference Report, the sole issue to be addressed at the February 12 hearing was "whether the [Agency] can prove by a preponderance of evidence that an affirmative defense under the Equal Pay Act accounts for [Complainant 1] being paid less money for substantially equal work than male CPD's since 1997." Additional filings in the record support the conclusion that Complainants focused their efforts on demonstrating the Agency violated the EPA, not Tide VII, by paying them less than male counterparts. Our focus is whether the AJ erroneously applied the law or abused her discretion. In this case, we find no such misapplication or abuse of discretion has occurred. On the balance of the evidence and due to the overlapping nature of Complainants' successful claim, the AJ's 10% deduction was arguably within the range of appropriate deductions. However, because our review of the record shows that significant periods of effort were expended by Complainants' counsel on more uniquely EPA issues, we exercise our own discretion to apply an additional 10% across-the-board reduction to the fees awarded by the AJ. Unsuccessful Claims The AJ deducted 10% from Complainants' Fee Petition for efforts expended on unsuccessful claims. See MD-110 � VI.A.7 (hours spent on unsuccessful claims should be excluded). Complainant 1 succeeded on one of four claims while Complainant 2 succeeded on one of three claims. While the AJ did not offer an explanation, Complainants' successful claim observably constituted the vast majority of litigation. Thus, we find that a 10% deduction for the pursuit of unsuccessful claim was not an abuse of discretion. Duplicative and Excessive Billing; All hours reasonably spent in processing the complaint are compensable, but the number of hours should not include excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours. MD-110 at 11-15. A reasonable hourly rate is based on prevailing market rates in the relevant community for attorneys of similar experience in similar cases. MD-110 at 11-6. An application for attorney's fees must include a verified statement of attorney's fees accompanied by an affidavit executed by the attorney of record itemizing the attorney's charges for legal services. MD-110 at 11-9. While the attorney is not required to record in great detail the manner in which each minute of his time was expended, the attorney does have the burden of identifying the subject matters on which he spent his time by submitting sufficiently detailed and contemporaneous time records to ensure that the time spent was accurately recorded. See Spencer v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 07A10035 (May 6, 2003). The attorney requesting the fee award has the burden of proving, by specific evidence, entitlement to the requested fees and costs. Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Dep't of Def" 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Koren v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05A20843 (Feb. 18, 2003).