First Coast Energy, L.L.P. v. Dhukani Holdings, LLC

21 Cited authorities

Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 104 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 188 times 30 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 72 times 4 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 72 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC
794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 28 times 2 Legal Analyses
Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 26 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
In re Nat. Data Corp.
753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 70 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
In re Detroit Athletic Co.
903 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2018) Cited 17 times
Finding "the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first"
In re I.Am.Symbolic, LLC
866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017) Cited 17 times
Finding that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion
Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U.
797 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 17 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Board erred in giving little weight to evidence of registered third-party marks in actual use
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,806 times 124 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1057 - Certificates of registration
15 U.S.C. § 1057 Cited 1,027 times 5 Legal Analyses
Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

First Coast Energy, L.L.P. v. Dhukani Holdings, LLC

21 Cited authorities

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"

Finding "the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first"

Finding that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion

Holding that the Board erred in giving little weight to evidence of registered third-party marks in actual use

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"