Fextel Inc. v. Avatar Technologies Inc.

15 Cited authorities

In re Bayer
488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007) Cited 40 times 2 Legal Analyses
Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd.
695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 25 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"
Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982) Cited 58 times
Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
Yamaha Intern. Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co.
840 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988) Cited 46 times 2 Legal Analyses
Finding secondary meaning for shape of guitar head always appearing in advertising and promotional literature
H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Ass'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc.
782 F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986) Cited 46 times 8 Legal Analyses
Reversing decision of TTAB that "Fire Chief," as applied to monthly magazine circulated to fire departments, was generic
Bellsouth Corp. v. Datanational Corp.
60 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995) Cited 26 times
Finding summary judgment appropriate where all evidence was "uncontested"
In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States
675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 8 times 2 Legal Analyses
No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
In re Gyulay
820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
Section 2 - Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
15 U.S.C. § 2 Cited 4,490 times 31 Legal Analyses
In § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities.
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,914 times 126 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,610 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 24 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Fextel Inc. v. Avatar Technologies Inc.

15 Cited authorities

Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"

Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"

Finding secondary meaning for shape of guitar head always appearing in advertising and promotional literature

Reversing decision of TTAB that "Fire Chief," as applied to monthly magazine circulated to fire departments, was generic

Finding summary judgment appropriate where all evidence was "uncontested"

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

In § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities.

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"