Fetching Designs LLC dba Smart Cookie v. The SMART-COOKEE Co. LLC

22 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 188 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  2. Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin

    396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 72 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
  3. Ritchie v. Simpson

    170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 48 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
  4. Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina

    670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
  5. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America

    970 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 38 times
    Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"
  6. T.A.B. Systems v. Pactel Teletrac

    77 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 29 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that press releases, slide show presentations, brochures, and news articles were insufficient to establish analogous use trademark rights where the evidence presented did not support an inference that "a substantial share of the consuming public had been reached" or that "the consuming public came to identify" the mark with defendant's services
  7. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.

    315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
  8. Application of Abcor Development Corp.

    588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 36 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
  9. Jewelers Vigilance Comm. v. Ullenberg Corp.

    823 F.2d 490 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 24 times
    Finding a “real interest” in a mark's registration can be shown “without proprietary rights in the mark or without asserting that it has a right or has an interest in using the alleged mark”
  10. University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.

    703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 19 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
  11. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,806 times   124 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,585 times   271 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  13. Section 1057 - Certificates of registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1057   Cited 1,026 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark
  14. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"