Excelled Sheepskin & Leather Coat Corp. and Rogue Apparel Group, Inc. v. Rock & Rogue, LLC

32 Cited authorities

Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 108 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 190 times 32 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 74 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
In re Cordua Rests., Inc.
823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016) Cited 27 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that certain words referring to key aspects of a genus of services were generic for those services
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP
746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 25 times
Reviewing the weight given to the similarity-of-the-marks factor for legal error
In re Nat. Data Corp.
753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 73 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 26 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
In re I.Am.Symbolic, LLC
866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017) Cited 17 times
Finding that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion
In re Chippendales USA, Inc.
622 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) Cited 23 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that whether the trade dress was "a common basic shape or design" was "inapplicable" because "there has been no showing that the [trade dress] is common generally"
Section 1125 - False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden
15 U.S.C. § 1125 Cited 15,715 times 326 Legal Analyses
Holding "the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional"
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,600 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Excelled Sheepskin & Leather Coat Corp. and Rogue Apparel Group, Inc. v. Rock & Rogue, LLC

32 Cited authorities

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Holding that certain words referring to key aspects of a genus of services were generic for those services

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Reviewing the weight given to the similarity-of-the-marks factor for legal error

Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Finding that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion

Holding that whether the trade dress was "a common basic shape or design" was "inapplicable" because "there has been no showing that the [trade dress] is common generally"

Holding "the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional"

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"