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Ex Parte Zimmer et al

10498167 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2013)
Ex Parte Zimmer et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,522 times   180 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. In re Baxter Travenol Labs

    952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 94 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Evaluating teaching of prior art at the time of disclosure

  3. In re Clay

    966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 87 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that a reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA "would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] problem ... by considering" that reference

  4. In re Icon Health

    496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 46 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[a]nalogous art to Icon's application," which related to "a treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position," included "any area describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the folding bed in" the prior art

  5. In re De Blauwe

    736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the

  6. Application of Aller

    220 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1955)   Cited 46 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding no criticality where claimed conditions allegedly contributed to roughly 20 percentage point improvement in yield

  7. Application of Klosak

    455 F.2d 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 6 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8582. March 9, 1972. Charles W. B. Connors, Chicago, Ill. (Johnston, Root, O'Keeffe, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., son Shurtleff), Chicago, Ill., attorneys E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,061 times   459 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)