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Ex Parte Yew et al

10612129 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 22, 2005)
Ex Parte Yew et al

14 Cited authorities

  1. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,190 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness

  2. In re Rouffet

    149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 160 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that objective evidence of nonobviousness [secondary considerations] "includes copying, long felt but unsolved need, failure of others, commercial success, unexpected results created by the claimed invention, unexpected properties of the claimed invention, licenses showing industry respect for the invention, and skepticism of skilled artisans before the invention"

  3. Pro-Mold Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics

    75 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 155 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, though we do not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair competition claims, our own circuit law nonetheless determines when inequitable conduct also constitutes unfair competition

  4. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp.

    837 F.2d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 163 times
    Holding that the burden of proof is not reduced when prior art presented to the court was not considered by the PTO

  5. In re Dembiczak

    175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 93 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Refusing to consider an obviousness rejection raised for the first time on appeal from the PTO

  6. Ashland Oil, v. Delta Resins Refractories

    776 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 120 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "[w]hile the opinion testimony of a party having a direct interest in the pending litigation is less persuasive than opinion testimony by a disinterested party, it cannot be disregarded for that reason alone and may be relied upon when sufficiently convincing"

  7. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Company

    357 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 41 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that the obviousness determination rests on "various factual findings that this court reviews for clear error following a bench trial"

  8. In re Fine

    837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 69 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing the Board's determination that dependent claims were invalid because "[d]ependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious."

  9. In re Bell

    991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 32 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 92-1375. April 20, 1993. Robert P. Blackburn, Chiron Corp., Emeryville, CA, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Debra A. Shetka and Thomas E. Ciotti, Morrison Foerster, Palo Alto, CA, and Donald S. Chisum, Morrison Foerster, Seattle, WA. Teddy S. Gron, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Of counsel were John W. Dewhirst, Lee E. Barrett, Richard E. Schafer and Albin F. Drost. Appeal from the Patent

  10. In re Fritch

    972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 32 times
    Stating "dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious"

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)