No. 90-1039. June 29, 1990. Marina V. Schneller, Mobil Oil Corp., Fairfax, Va., argued, for appellants. With her on the brief, was Alexander J. McKillop. Thomas G. De Jonghe, Chevron Corp., San Francisco, Cal., argued, for appellees. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Before MICHEL, Circuit Judge, BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WILL, Senior District Judge. The Honorable Hubert L. Will, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
Patent Appeal No. 7405. June 17, 1965. V. Alexander Scher, George J. Brandt, Jr., New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (George C. Roeming, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. WORLEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals which affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 8-11 in appellant's application for a "Method of Preparing Bituminous
Patent Appeal No. 6554. April 6, 1960. Morrison, Kennedy Campbell, Luther E. Morrison, New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'Connell, pursuant to provisions of Section 294(d), Title 28
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)