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Ex Parte Wong et al

11706833 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 16, 2012)
Ex Parte Wong et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,577 times   189 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing

    851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 169 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that patentee bears the burden of proving a nexus between claimed secondary considerations and the merits of the patented invention

  3. Cable Elec. Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc.

    770 F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 135 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding on summary judgment that even though commercial success could be deduced, it deserved no weight because a nexus was not established

  4. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 29 times
    Concluding a compound was undisputedly taught in the prior art and then determining that additional limitations that merely "set forth the intended use for, or a property inherent in, an otherwise old composition . . . do not differentiate the claimed composition from those known to the prior art"

  5. Application of Mageli

    470 F.2d 1380 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 12 times
    Rejecting the "close case" argument, noting that the Graham decision "provided new guidance" in the area of, inter alia, secondary considerations

  6. Application of Noznick

    478 F.2d 1260 (C.C.P.A. 1973)

    Patent Appeal No. 8908. June 7, 1973. Alvin Guttag, Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellants, William T. Bullinger, Washington, D.C., Cushman, Darby Cushman, Washington, D.C., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, Associate Judges, and ALMOND, Senior Judge. ALMOND, Senior Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,174 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,034 times   1029 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 189 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.50 - Decisions and other actions by the Board

    37 C.F.R. § 41.50   Cited 34 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Requiring petitioners to raise the Board's failure to designate a new ground of rejection in a timely request for rehearing

  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)