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Ex Parte Udrea et al

15073937 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 22, 2019)
Ex Parte Udrea et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. United States v. Adams

    383 U.S. 39 (1966)   Cited 479 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have to ignore long-accepted factors in the field of wet batters to arrive at the claimed invention

  3. Johnston v. Ivac Corp.

    885 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 266 times
    Holding that Section 112 "operates to cut back on the types of means which could literally satisfy the claim language" and thereby "restricts the scope of the literal claim language" by requiring the structures to appear in the specification

  4. Celeritas Technologies, Ltd. v. Rockwell International Corp.

    150 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 196 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding award of damages for breach of contract was properly based on licensing fee established by expert testimony

  5. In re Mouttet

    686 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 86 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding "the Board's determination that eliminating the optical components of Falk would not destroy its principle of operation to be supported by substantial evidence"

  6. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P.

    327 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 108 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding district court's claim construction erroneously excluded an embodiment described in an example in the specification, where the prosecution history showed no such disavowal of claim scope

  7. Application of Nievelt

    482 F.2d 965 (C.C.P.A. 1973)

    Patent Appeal No. 8975. August 30, 1973. L. Gaylord Hulbert, Whittemore, Hulbert Belknap, Detroit, Mich., attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Robert D. Edmonds, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and ALMOND, Senior Judge. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals, adhered to on reconsideration

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)