Ex Parte Taniguchi et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,190 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness
  2. Pfizer v. Apotex

    480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 383 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court clearly erred when it failed to consider relevant prior art
  3. Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.

    864 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 222 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that because the record established such a strong case of obviousness based on the teachings of the prior art, the fact that the product was successful does not overcome the conclusion of obviousness
  4. In re Huang

    100 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 94 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the inventor's opinion as to the purchaser's reason for buying the product is insufficient to demonstrate a nexus
  5. In re Peterson

    315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 69 times   14 Legal Analyses
    Holding that any overlap between a claimed range and one in the prior art is sufficient for a prima facie case of obviousness, even if insufficient to render it unpatentable
  6. Süd-Chemie, Inc. v. Multisorb Technologies, Inc.

    554 F.3d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 17 times
    Affirming finding that reference disclosed "uncoated" film where it did not describe the film as coated and did not suggest necessity of coatings
  7. In re Kerkhoven

    626 F.2d 846 (C.C.P.A. 1980)   Cited 6 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 79-586. May 15, 1980. James J. Farrell, New York City, attorney of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, and Trademarks; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and NEWMAN, Judge. The Honorable Bernard Newman, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. NEWMAN, Judge. This is an

  8. Application of Klosak

    455 F.2d 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 6 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8582. March 9, 1972. Charles W. B. Connors, Chicago, Ill. (Johnston, Root, O'Keeffe, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., son Shurtleff), Chicago, Ill., attorneys E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)