Patent Appeal No. 76-677. March 31, 1977. Joseph T. Eisele, John Kurucz, Kane, Dalsimer, Kane, Sullivan Kurucz, New York City, attorneys of record for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of Counsel. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of United States Patent Office. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and HERBERT N. MALETZ, Associate Judge, United States Customs Court. MILLER, Judge. This appeal
Appeal No. 82-583. July 27, 1983. William H. Epstein, Nutley, N.J., argued, for appellant. With him on the brief was George M. Gould, Nutley, N.J. Harris A. Pitlick, Washington, D.C., argued, for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol. and Fred E. McKelvey, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Robert W. Furlong, Boston, Mass., argued, for intervenor. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MILLER, Circuit Judge, COWEN, Senior Circuit Judge, and SMITH
Patent Appeal No. 6862. January 16, 1963. Bosworth, Sessions, Herrstrom Knowles, Paul S. Sessions, Cleveland, Ohio (Spencer B. Michael, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of claims
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)