Ex Parte Shutty et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. In re Fulton

    391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 85 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a particular combination" need not "be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation"
  2. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"
  3. In re Giannelli

    739 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 26 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Reversing affirmance of examiner's obviousness determination where the Board's analysis "contained no explanation why or how [a skilled artisan] would modify" the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention
  4. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant
  5. In re Sullivan

    498 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 22 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Considering inventor testimony regarding unexpected properties and holding that Board erred by not considering inventor declaration
  6. In re Glaug

    283 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 13 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Nos. 00-1571, 08/455,374. DECIDED: March 15, 2002. Appeal from the decision of Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals. Meredith Martin Addy, Brinks, Hofer Gilson Lione, of Chicago, IL, argued for appellants. With her on the brief were Robert N. Carpenter and Henry L. Brinks. Linda Moncys Isacson, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, Patent and Trademark Office, of Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With her on the brief was John M. Whealan, Solicitor, and Mary Critharis

  7. Chester v. Miller

    906 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 19 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 90-1039. June 29, 1990. Marina V. Schneller, Mobil Oil Corp., Fairfax, Va., argued, for appellants. With her on the brief, was Alexander J. McKillop. Thomas G. De Jonghe, Chevron Corp., San Francisco, Cal., argued, for appellees. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Before MICHEL, Circuit Judge, BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WILL, Senior District Judge. The Honorable Hubert L. Will, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,173 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 189 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well
  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)