Ex Parte Shindo et al

14 Cited authorities

  1. Halliburton Energy v. M-I LLC

    514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 446 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a claim is "indefinite if a [claim] term does not have proper antecedent basis"
  2. Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.

    439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 272 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding arguments insufficiently developed in briefing are forfeited
  3. In re Peterson

    315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 66 times   14 Legal Analyses
    Holding that any overlap between a claimed range and one in the prior art is sufficient for a prima facie case of obviousness, even if insufficient to render it unpatentable
  4. In re Packard

    751 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 35 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Addressing the issues separately
  5. Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal

    129 F.3d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 59 times
    Holding that reduction to practice does not occur until inventor knows embodiment will work for its intended purposes
  6. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant
  7. In re Thorpe

    777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 39 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that prior art pertinent only to product is proper ground for rejecting product-by-process claims
  8. In re Harris

    409 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that unexpected results require a difference in kind, not merely degree (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996))
  9. Application of Fessmann

    489 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 7 times

    Patent Appeal No. 9121. January 10, 1974. Edward W. Goldstein, Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents, Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, LANE and MILLER, Judges, and ALMOND, Senior Judge. ALMOND, Senior Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection, under 35

  10. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,288 times   1030 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it
  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,065 times   461 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 183 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)