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Ex Parte Segal et al

10614807 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 27, 2009)
Ex Parte Segal et al

6 Cited authorities

  1. In re Alton

    76 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that when the examiner alleges that the claimed embodiment is outside the scope of the specification, he "need only establish this fact to make out a prima facie case"

  2. Hyatt v. Doll

    576 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 5 times

    No. 2007-1066. August 11, 2009. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Henry H. Kennedy, Jr., J. Kenneth C. Bass, III, Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein Fox P.L.L.C., of Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. On the brief were Wilma A. Lewis and Michael I. Coe, Crowell Moring LLP, of Washington, DC. Of counsel on the brief was Gregory L. Roth, Law Offices of Gregory L. Roth, of La Palma, CA. Of counsel was Michael L. Martinez, Crowell Moring LLP, of Washington

  3. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 29 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate

  4. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,418 times   1068 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  5. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  6. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)