No. 3-555 / 02-1256 Filed September 24, 2003 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Amanda P. Potterfield, Judge. Teena Aller appeals from various portions of the decree dissolving her marriage to Brian Aller. AFFIRMED. David McManus of Glasson, Sole, McManus Pearson, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant. Christine Crilley of the Crilley Law Office, Cedar Rapids, for appellee. Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ. HECHT, J. Teena Aller appeals from various portions of
Patent Appeal No. 75-547. October 23, 1975. Glenn O. Starke, Milwaukee, Wis., atty. of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. LANE, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 10-15
Patent Appeal No. 8582. March 9, 1972. Charles W. B. Connors, Chicago, Ill. (Johnston, Root, O'Keeffe, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., son Shurtleff), Chicago, Ill., attorneys E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)