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Ex Parte Schuetz et al

13601443 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 20, 2016)
Ex Parte Schuetz et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,572 times   188 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Wyers v. Master Lock Co.

    616 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 207 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success exist when "it is simply a matter of common sense" to combine known elements of the prior art to solve a known problem

  3. In re GPAC Inc.

    57 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 168 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In GPAC, for example, we found that a reference disclosing an equilibrium air door was reasonably pertinent to a patent directed to asbestos removal because they both addressed the same problem of "maintaining a pressurized environment while allowing for human ingress and egress."

  4. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 150 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  5. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  6. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  7. In re Mlot-Fijalkowski

    676 F.2d 666 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 4 times

    Appeal No. 81-597. April 15, 1982. Otto R. Krause, Chicago, Ill., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and Henry W. Tarring, II, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for the Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from a decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) sustaining the examiner's rejection of claims

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,169 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)