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Ex Parte Schmid

10 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,575 times   189 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.

    587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 120 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Holding that “an analysis of obviousness ... may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill [which] do[es] not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion”

  3. Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc.

    392 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 137 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Noting that licenses "may constitute evidence of nonobviousness; however, only little weight can be attributed to such evidence if the patentee does not demonstrate a nexus between the merits of the invention and the licenses of record" (quoting In re GPAC Inc. , 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) )

  4. In re Icon Health

    496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 46 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[a]nalogous art to Icon's application," which related to "a treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position," included "any area describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the folding bed in" the prior art

  5. In re Merck Co., Inc.

    800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 70 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a person of skill in the art would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans because of the drugs’ close structural similarity and similar use

  6. Application of Wright

    569 F.2d 1124 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 27 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-677. March 31, 1977. Joseph T. Eisele, John Kurucz, Kane, Dalsimer, Kane, Sullivan Kurucz, New York City, attorneys of record for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of Counsel. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of United States Patent Office. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and HERBERT N. MALETZ, Associate Judge, United States Customs Court. MILLER, Judge. This appeal

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)