Ex Parte Schenkel et al

6 Cited authorities

  1. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 90 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter
  2. In re Baxter Travenol Labs

    952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 96 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Evaluating teaching of prior art at the time of disclosure
  3. Velander v. Garner

    348 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 61 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Reviewing the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' finding of a reasonable expectation of success under a "substantial evidence" standard
  4. Application of Prindle

    297 F.2d 251 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    Patent Appeals No. 6714. January 12, 1962. Ely, Pearne Gordon, Albert L. Ely, Jr., Cleveland, Ohio, for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions of Section

  5. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,159 times   489 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  6. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)