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Ex Parte Sarkisian et al

13157962 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 16, 2016)
Ex Parte Sarkisian et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. Pfizer v. Apotex

    480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 370 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court clearly erred when it failed to consider relevant prior art

  2. In re Peterson

    315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 66 times   14 Legal Analyses
    Holding that any overlap between a claimed range and one in the prior art is sufficient for a prima facie case of obviousness, even if insufficient to render it unpatentable

  3. In re Harris

    409 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that unexpected results require a difference in kind, not merely degree (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996))

  4. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate

  5. Application of Tiffin

    448 F.2d 791 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 21 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8502. October 7, 1971. Alvin Guttag, Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellants; William T. Bullinger, Washington, D.C., Sheldon F. Raizes, Wilmington, Del., Cushman, Darby Cushman, Washington, D.C., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING PER CURIAM. The Patent Office petitions for a rehearing or modification of our decision, handed down June 10, 1971. The

  6. Meitzner v. Mindick

    549 F.2d 775 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 76-577. February 24, 1977. Rehearing Denied April 28, 1977. Eugene Sabol, Fisher, Christen Sabol, Washington, D.C., attys. of record, for appellants; George W.F. Simmons, Robert A. Doherty, Rohm Haas Co., Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel. Herbert B. Keil, Michael P. Bucklo, Johnston, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill., David B. Kellom, Bernd W. Sandt, Midland, Mich., attys. of record, for appellees. Appeal from the Board of Patent Interferences. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and

  7. Application of Klosak

    455 F.2d 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 6 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8582. March 9, 1972. Charles W. B. Connors, Chicago, Ill. (Johnston, Root, O'Keeffe, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., son Shurtleff), Chicago, Ill., attorneys E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,059 times   449 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)