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Ex Parte Sapozhnikov et al

14167575 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 22, 2017)
Ex Parte Sapozhnikov et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S

    108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 338 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding a preliminary injunction should not issue if defendant raises a substantial question as to validity, enforceability, or infringement

  2. In re Wands

    858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 333 times   41 Legal Analyses
    Holding that whether undue experimentation is required is a "conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations. . . . includ[ing] the quantity of experimentation necessary, the amount of direction or guidance presented, the presence or absence of working examples, the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in the art, the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and the breadth of the claims."

  3. Alza Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC

    603 F.3d 935 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 106 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding claims were not enabled because relevant field "was not mature" and the claimed dosage was considered a "'breakaway' from the prior art"

  4. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc.

    188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 136 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a reasonable amount of experimentation does not invalidate a patent, but undue experimentation does invalidate, and holding that the Wands factors, which determine whether a patent's disclosure is insufficient such that the experimentation required would be undue, apply to inter partes litigation

  5. Automotive Tech. v. BMW of N.A.

    501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 66 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Finding that because the claim includes "both mechanical and electronic side impact sensors," both must be enabled

  6. Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc.

    754 F.3d 952 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 51 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Affirming judgment that claims were not inherently anticipated where the prior art only showed that the limitation might occur, not that it inevitably occurred

  7. Reese v. Hurst

    661 F.2d 1222 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 34 times
    In Reese v. Hurst, 211 USPQ 936, 941, 943 (CCPA 1981), our predecessor court affirmed a Board decision that a reduction to practice had occurred on the date that test results were obtained instead of on the later date when the results were conveyed to the inventor; however, the court did not explain this aspect of its decision.

  8. Leach Co. v. Peirson

    275 U.S. 120 (1927)   Cited 49 times
    In Leach Co. v. Peirson, 275 U.S. 120, 128, 48 S.Ct. 57, 58, 72 L.Ed. 194, 55 A.L.R. 457, where such evidence was excluded (in a ruling said by Wigmore, op. cit., to be erroneous "both on principle and on the particular facts"), it was pointed out that there were no circumstances "to take it out of the general rule.

  9. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,280 times   1025 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)