Ex Parte Sandstrom

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 28, 2015

10170260 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte MARK HENRIK SANDSTROM
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Appeal 2012-008976
Application 10/170,260
Technology Center 2400
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Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, THU A. DANG, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2012-008976
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Examiner finally rejected claims 65–67, 69–77, 86, 89, and
93–96. (Ans. 3–4). Claims 68, 78–85, 87, 88, and 90–92 are objected to by
the Examiner. (Id.). Appellant appeals from the final rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
INVENTION
This invention is directed to an "input-controllable dynamic cross-
connect." (Title). Claim 65, reproduced below, is representative of the
claimed subject matter:
65. A method for dynamically multiplexing data onto a
repeating sequence of multiplexed channels on data output, the
method comprising, for each of a series of repeating timeslots, a
set of steps including:
[a] receiving a set of input signals on a set of data inputs;
[b] forming a selector to identify one of the data inputs; and
[c] connecting to the data output the data input that is identified
for the timeslot,
[d] wherein forming the selector is done dynamically based at
least in part on a status indicator of at least one of the data
inputs, with said indicator expressing whether the given data
input associated with said indicator is to be selected for the
current timeslot, and
[e] wherein the method involves a control process by which, for
any single timeslot, at most one indicator expresses that its
associated data input is to be selected.
(Disputed limitation emphasized, bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
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REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 65 and 73 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings and suggestions of Yamazaki
(US. 6,961,343 B1), Donohue (US 6,883,084 B1), and Ozaki (US 6,888,841
B1).
R2. Claims 66, 67, 69–72, 74–77, 86, and 93–96 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings and
suggestions of Yamazaki , Donohoe , Ozaki, and Appellant's Admitted
Prior Art (AAPA).
R3. Claim 89 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings and suggestions of Yamazaki,
Donohoe, Ozaki, AAPA, Ozaki, Clinton (US 7,110,358), Honda (US
2001/0038607), and Mochizuki (US 6,674,714).

GROUPING OF CLAIMS
Based on Appellant's arguments, we decide the appeal of claims 65
and 73 rejected under rejection R1 on the basis of representative claim 65.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004). 1
We address the rejections R2 and R3 separately, infra.

1 Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on July 16, 2011. The date of filing the
Notice of Appeal determines which set of rules applies to an Ex Parte
appeal. If a Notice of Appeal is filed prior to January 23, 2012, then the
2004 version of the Board Rules last published in the 2011 edition of Title
37 of the Code of Federal Regulations (37 C.F.R. § 41.1 et seq.) applies to
the appeal. See also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) 8th
ed., Rev. 8, July 2010.
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ANALYSIS
We consider all of Appellant's arguments and evidence presented. We
disagree with Appellant's contentions regarding the Examiner's rejections of
the claims. We adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by
the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Answer in response to arguments
made in Appellant's Appeal Brief. (Ans. 18–22). We highlight and address
specific findings and arguments below:
Rejection R1 – Representative Claim 65
Claim 65 recites, in pertinent part: (emphasis added)
[e] wherein the method involves a control process by which, for
any single timeslot, at most one indicator expresses that its
associated data input is to be selected.
Appellant contends:
The Examiner's finding that in Ozaki "in some examples, only
one input would request an output," is an admission that Ozaki
fails to teach a mechanism that ensures that only one input
would request an output for any single timeslot, as claimed.
A system that might happen to have one input indicated
as active for selection for the multiplexer output for each
multiplexing times lot (i.e., Ozaki) is different than a system
that ensures there to be at most one input indicated as active for
selection for the multiplexer output for each multiplexing
timeslot (i.e., the claimed invention).
(Reply Br. 3).
Appellant's contentions are unpersuasive because Appellant does not
address and rebut the specific findings relied on by the Examiner. (Reply
Br. 3; Ans. 21). In particular, the Examiner relies on Ozaki's reservation
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status for teaching or suggesting limitation [e] "at most one indicator . . . ,"
and not on Ozaki's requests for output as Appellant contends. (Id.).2
We also disagree with Appellant's contention because it is not
commensurate with the broader scope of claim 65 limitation [e]: "for any
single timeslot . . . ." (Emphasis added). Specifically, the claim 65
limitation [e] one indicator "for any single timeslot . . . " does not require
one input indicator "for each multiplexing timeslot" as Appellant urges.
(Reply Br. 3). Moreover, the broadest reasonable interpretation of limitation
[e] one input indicator "for any single timeslot," is also met by Ozaki's
teaching or suggestion of one request for a "single timeslot." (Ans. 20).
(Emphasis added).
For these reasons, on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner
erred.
B.
Regarding the claim 65 limitation [e] “single timeslot”: Appellant
contends:
The specification describes the claimed "timeslot" as a single
clock cycle on which the multiplexing logic system operates.

2 The Examiner finds:
[T]he Examiner equates Ozaki's reservation status to the
claimed indicator that "expresses that its associated data input
is to be selected" on a given multiplexing timeslot because the
reservation status from a previous scheduling module is a
previous input/output configuration information. Thus the
scheduling module makes an input reservation to an output port
based on the reservation status information so as to avoid
coming into collision with other scheduling modules.
(Emphasis added; Ans.21).
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This is seen e.g. from paragraphs 0039, 0063 and 0065 of the
specification.
In contrast, Ozaki, at column 3 lines 52-54, discloses that
in it "one time slot is defined as a time period required for
forwarding a packet from one input port to one output port",
and as such, Ozaki's concept of timeslot is not equatable to the
claimed single multiplexing times lot lasting for one
multiplexing digital logic clock cycle.
(App. Br. 8).
Appellant's contention is unpersuasive because it is not commensurate
with the broader scope of the claim. Specifically, the claim does not recite a
“timeslot” that is "a single clock cycle on which the multiplexing logic
system operates," as described in the Specification and argued by Appellant.
(Id.). Moreover, Appellant fails to cite a more narrow definition of
"timeslot" in the Specification to support a more narrow interpretation.
(Id.).3 We decline Appellant's invitation to read limitations from the
Specification into the claims. (Id.).
Our reviewing court guides: “[A]lthough the specification often
describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly
warned against confining the claims to those embodiments . . . . [C]laims

3 Any special meaning assigned to a term "must be sufficiently clear in the
specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood
by a person of experience in the field of the invention." Multiform
Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see
also Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("A patentee may act as its own lexicographer and assign to
a term a unique definition that is different from its ordinary and customary
meaning; however, a patentee must clearly express that intent in the written
description.").

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may embrace ‘different subject matter than is illustrated in the specific
embodiments in the specification.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). A basic canon of claim
construction is that one may not read a limitation into a claim from the
written description. Renishaw plc v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d
1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Because “applicants may amend claims to
narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no
unfairness to the applicant or patentee.” In re ICON Health and Fitness,
Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
This reasoning is applicable here. For these reasons, on this record,
we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Accordingly, we sustain rejection
R1 of representative claim 65, and the claim 73, which falls therewith. (See
Grouping of Claims, supra).
Rejections R2 and R3
Regarding the remaining claims rejected under rejections R2 and R3,
Appellant urges these claims are patentable by virtue of their respective
dependencies from independent claims 65 and 73. (App. Br. 9–12).
However, we find no deficiencies regarding the rejection of independent
claims 65 and 73 for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner's rejections R2 and R3 of the claims rejected thereunder. (See
Grounds of Rejection, supra).

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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 65–67, 69–77, 86, 89,
and 93–96 under § 103.
No time for taking any action connected with this appeal may be
extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED

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