Ex Parte RUGGIE

14 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,523 times   180 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 142 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight
  3. In re O'Farrell

    853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 163 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent obvious where the prior art provided a "reasonable expectation of success"
  4. In re Translogic Technology

    504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 44 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Recognizing that the Supreme Court set aside the rigid application of the TSM Test and ensured use of customary knowledge as an ingredient in that equation.
  5. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness
  6. In re Zletz

    893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 42 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims failing this test during prosecution must be rejected under § 112, ¶ 2
  7. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 43 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"
  8. In re Sovish

    769 F.2d 738 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 8 times

    Appeal No. 85-781. July 26, 1985. James W. Geriak, Lyon Lyon, of Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for appellants. With him on brief were Roy L. Anderson and William E. Mouzavires, Lyon Lyon, Washington, D.C. Fred W. Sherling, Associate Solicitor, U.S. Patent Trademark Office, Arlington, Va., argued, for appellee. With him on brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol. and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before RICH, Circuit

  9. Application of Bozek

    416 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 10 times
    Noting that a patent examiner may properly rely on "common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordinary skill in the art" in making conclusions regarding obviousness
  10. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,289 times   1031 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it
  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,066 times   464 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 183 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)