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Ex Parte RUBIN

21 Cited authorities

  1. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck Co.

    722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 262 times
    Finding that the "right to exclude recognized in a patent is the essence of the concept of property"

  2. In re Fulton

    391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 81 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a particular combination" need not "be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation"

  3. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.

    752 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 58 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding no clear error in district court's fact finding that "entecavir's ‘effectiveness against hepatitis B without known toxicity issues’ was ‘not unexpected ,’ " and deferring to district court's finding that this was not sufficient evidence of nonobviousness

  4. In re Soni

    54 F.3d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 91 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding "substantially improved results" to overcome obviousness when the 50-fold improvement in tensile strength was much greater than would have been predicted

  5. In re Skvorecz

    580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 50 times
    Finding that the phrase "at the separation" "d[id] not require further antecedent basis" because "a person skilled in the field of the invention would understand the claim when viewed in the context of the specification"

  6. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  7. In re De Blauwe

    736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the

  8. In re Fracalossi

    681 F.2d 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Addressing whether specific anticipation rejection was sufficient evidentiary support for obviousness rejection

  9. In re Margolis

    785 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 11 times
    Stating that where dependent claims "were not argued separately, [they] need not be separately considered"

  10. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  11. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,362 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  12. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  13. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  14. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  15. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  16. Section 651-A:1 - Purpose of Parole

    N.H. Rev. Stat. § 651-A:1

    It is the intent of the legislature that the state parole system provide a means of supervising and rehabilitating offenders without continued incarceration and a means by which prisoners can be aided in the transition from prison to society. It is also the intent of the legislature that the policies, procedures and actions of the adult parole board and the department of corrections relative to the administration of this system emphasize the need to protect the public from criminal acts by parolees

  17. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)