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Ex Parte Rosenshein et al

13473382 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2016)
Ex Parte Rosenshein et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,520 times   172 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Leapfrog v. Fisher-Price

    485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 90 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the objective considerations of nonobviousness presented, including substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, and long-felt need, were inadequate to overcome a strong showing of primary considerations that rendered the claims at issue invalid

  3. In re Bigio

    381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 71 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Affirming conclusion that toothbrush and small hair brush were in same field of endeavor because "the structural similarities between toothbrushes and small brushes for hair would have led one of ordinary skill in the art working in the specific field of hairbrushes to consider all similar brushes including toothbrushes"

  4. In re Clay

    966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 87 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that a reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA "would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] problem ... by considering" that reference

  5. In re Merck Co., Inc.

    800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 70 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a person of skill in the art would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans because of the drugs’ close structural similarity and similar use

  6. In re Klein

    647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 19 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 2010-1411. June 6, 2011. Louis W. Tompros, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale and Dorr, LLP, of Boston, MA, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Larissa B. Park and Katherine B. Dirks. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Robert J. McManus, Associate Solicitor. Before, NEWMAN, SCHALL, and LINN, Circuit Judges. SCHALL, Circuit Judge. Arnold

  7. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 43 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,059 times   449 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)