Appeal No. 86-1692. Decided April 21, 1987. Philip A. Mallinckrodt, of Mallinckrodt Mallinckrodt, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant. Harris A. Pitlick, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, Arlington, Va., for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Solicitor, and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Solicitor. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before SMITH, NEWMAN, and BISSELL, Circuit Judges. PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. Patent applicant Jay P. Nielson
Appeal No. 78-518. August 31, 1978. Donald Brown, Robert F. O'Connell, Boston, Mass., Dike, Bronstein, Roberts, Cushman Pfund, Boston, Mass., Attys. of record, for appellants; Martin P. Hoffman, Donald M. Sandler, Arlington, Va., Hoffman Sandler, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN, LANE
Patent Appeal No. 8392. April 22, 1971. Rehearing Denied June 10, 1971. William Kaufman, Harry H. Kline, Roland A. Dexter, Stamford, Conn., attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. R.E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and NEWMAN Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the
Patent Appeal No. 7265. July 22, 1965. Louis C. Smith, Jr., Francis M. Fazio, New York City, Paul A. Rose, Washington, D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (J.E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. MARTIN, Judge. Appellant Dunn with one Proops obtained a series of five patents for improvements in a classic synthesis of acrylic acid esters obtained by reaction of acetylene
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)