§

Ex Parte Rogers et al

12487112 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2016)
Ex Parte Rogers et al

13 Cited authorities

  1. Shinseki v. Sanders

    556 U.S. 396 (2009)   Cited 4,723 times
    Holding that a "notice error" was harmless because the respondent "ha[d] not explained to the Veterans Court, to the Federal Circuit, or to us how the notice error to which he points could have made any difference"

  2. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,568 times   187 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  3. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  4. In re Chapman

    595 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 12 times
    Remanding after correcting error in obviousness analysis

  5. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  6. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 29 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate

  7. Application of Aller

    220 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1955)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding no criticality where claimed conditions allegedly contributed to roughly 20 percentage point improvement in yield

  8. Futrall v. Ray

    111 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1940)   Cited 2 times

    No. 11653. May 13, 1940. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas; Harry J. Lemley, Judge. Action by E.B. Futrall, receiver of the Lee County National Bank, against Mrs. Ella M. Ray, to recover stockholder's assessment. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. John C. Sheffield, of Helena, Ark., for appellant. J.B. Daggett, of Marianna, Ark. (Daggett Daggett and C.E. Daggett, all of Marianna, Ark., on the brief), for appellee. Before

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,159 times   489 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)