Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark
No. 89-1510. August 3, 1990. Timothy W. Hagan (argued), Killworth, Gottman, Hagan Schaeff, Dayton, Ohio, for appellant. With him on the brief, was Richard A. Killworth. Also on the brief, were Alexander Weitz and Robert L. McKellar, Dow Corning Corp., Midland, Mich., of counsel. Richard E. Schafer (argued), Associate Sol., Office of Sol., Arlington, Va., for appellee. With him on the brief, was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals
Patent Appeal No. 8569. December 16, 1971. Donal E. McCarthy of McCarthy, Depaoli O'Brien, Washington, D.C., atty. of record, for appellants. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. R. E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. ALMOND, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)