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Ex Parte Reisman

12893246 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 28, 2016)
Ex Parte Reisman

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,575 times   189 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Leapfrog v. Fisher-Price

    485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 90 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the objective considerations of nonobviousness presented, including substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, and long-felt need, were inadequate to overcome a strong showing of primary considerations that rendered the claims at issue invalid

  3. In re Suitco Surface

    603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 36 times   5 Legal Analyses
    In Suitco, we disagreed with the Board's broadest reasonable construction of the term "finishing the top surface of the floor," because the Board's construction "allow[ed] the finishing material to fall anywhere above the surface being finished regardless of whether it actually ‘finishes’ the surface."

  4. In re Stepan Co.

    660 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 14 times

    No. 2010–1261.Reexamination Nos. 90/006,824 90/007,619. 2011-10-5 In re STEPAN COMPANY. Thomas J. Wimbiscus, McAndrews, Held & Malloy, Ltd. of Chicago, Illinois, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were George Wheeler, and Dennis H. Jaskoviak, Jr. Mary L. Kelly, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were, Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Janet A. Gongola, Associate Solicitor. PROST Thomas J. Wimbiscus

  5. In re Glaug

    283 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 13 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Nos. 00-1571, 08/455,374. DECIDED: March 15, 2002. Appeal from the decision of Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals. Meredith Martin Addy, Brinks, Hofer Gilson Lione, of Chicago, IL, argued for appellants. With her on the brief were Robert N. Carpenter and Henry L. Brinks. Linda Moncys Isacson, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, Patent and Trademark Office, of Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With her on the brief was John M. Whealan, Solicitor, and Mary Critharis

  6. Application of Warner

    379 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 7822. June 29, 1967. Richard E. Warner, for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. SMITH, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of the appealed claims under 35 U

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 41.50 - Decisions and other actions by the Board

    37 C.F.R. § 41.50   Cited 34 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Requiring petitioners to raise the Board's failure to designate a new ground of rejection in a timely request for rehearing

  9. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)

  10. Section 41.41 - Reply brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.41   Cited 9 times   25 Legal Analyses

    (a)Timing. Appellant may file only a single reply brief to an examiner's answer within the later of two months from the date of either the examiner's answer, or a decision refusing to grant a petition under § 1.181 of this title to designate a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer. (b)Content. (1) A reply brief shall not include any new or non-admitted amendment, or any new or non-admitted affidavit or other Evidence. See § 1.116 of this title for amendments, affidavits or other evidence

  11. Section 41.52 - Rehearing

    37 C.F.R. § 41.52   Cited 7 times   9 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) Appellant may file a single request for rehearing within two months of the date of the original decision of the Board. No request for rehearing from a decision on rehearing will be permitted, unless the rehearing decision so modified the original decision as to become, in effect, a new decision, and the Board states that a second request for rehearing would be permitted. The request for rehearing must state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by