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Ex Parte Reedy

23 Cited authorities

  1. Wied v. Valhi, Inc.

    465 U.S. 1026 (1984)   Cited 260 times
    Stating that "[t]o demand a slavish adherence to the procedural sequence and to require these defendants, in this case, to articulate the words of renewal once the motion had been taken under advisement, would be 'to succumb to a nominalism and a rigid trial scenario as equally at variance as ambush with the spirit of the rules.'"

  2. W.L. Gore Associates, Inc. v. Garlock

    721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 327 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court erred by "considering the references in less than their entireties, i.e., in disregarding disclosures in the references that diverge from and teach away from the invention at hand"

  3. Atlas Powder Company v. Ireco Incorporated

    190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 163 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding asserted claims covering air mixed into an explosive composition anticipated by prior art that necessarily also contained air as claimed, even though benefits of the air were not recognized

  4. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 150 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  5. MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum

    192 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 108 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding anticipation by inherency of a method of hair depilation

  6. Verdegaal Bros., v. Union Oil Co. of Calif

    814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 138 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding reliance on non-claimed distinction between prior art method and claimed method "inappropriate" and insufficient to save the claim from inherent anticipation

  7. Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

    713 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 111 times
    In Kalman, this court determined that the district court's fact finding of identity of invention (reached after a four day bench trial) was not clearly erroneous, and that "the stipulation by the parties, coupled with [Kimberly Clark's] failure to counter Kalman's affidavits and evidence submitted in his motion for summary judgment" dictated a finding of infringement.

  8. In re Oelrich

    666 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 94 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Stating that "[t]he mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient" to establish inherency (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer , 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939) )

  9. In re Spada

    911 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 58 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the claims were properly rejected by the PTO because they were anticipated by a prior art reference

  10. In re King

    801 F.2d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 46 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that principles of inherency do not prohibit a process patent for a new use of an old structure

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,174 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,034 times   1029 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  13. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"

  14. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)