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Ex parte PELTZER

07396733 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 30, 1998)
Ex parte PELTZER

24 Cited authorities

  1. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,179 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness

  2. Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn

    719 F.2d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 95 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an invention's market share is one of the factors the court may consider in evaluating the invention's commercial success

  3. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester

  4. Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. United States

    702 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 82 times
    Addressing obviousness

  5. Weinar v. Rollform Inc.

    744 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 71 times
    Holding that an oral contract is sufficient to confer co-plaintiff standing when the acts of infringement injured all of the plaintiffs and when “[m]ultiple recoveries are neither recoverable nor here involved”

  6. Application of Wood

    599 F.2d 1032 (C.C.P.A. 1979)   Cited 56 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that reference in the patent's specification to a field of art encompassing the alleged prior art supported a finding that the alleged prior art was within the inventor's field of endeavor.

  7. Knorr v. Pearson

    671 F.2d 1368 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 36 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that sufficient circumstantial evidence of an independent nature corroborated the junior party's testimony as to actual reduction to practice in an interference proceeding

  8. In re Deminski

    796 F.2d 436 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that if a prior art reference discloses essentially the same structure and function as the invention, it is likely in the same field of endeavor

  9. IN RE FOUT

    675 F.2d 297 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 24 times
    Holding preamble of Jepson-type claim to be admitted prior art where applicant's specification credited another as the inventor of the subject matter of the preamble

  10. In re Reuter

    670 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 25 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 80-604. June 18, 1981. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., Thomas E. Lynch, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Frederick A. Zoda, Trenton, N.J., atty., for appellants. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from a decision of the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") Board of Appeals ("board") which affirmed the examiner's rejections of claims

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)