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Ex Parte Park

6 Cited authorities

  1. Pro-Mold Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics

    75 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 155 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, though we do not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair competition claims, our own circuit law nonetheless determines when inequitable conduct also constitutes unfair competition

  2. In re Merck Co., Inc.

    800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 70 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a person of skill in the art would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans because of the drugs’ close structural similarity and similar use

  3. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  4. In re Hoch

    428 F.2d 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1970)   Cited 20 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8323. July 30, 1970. Raymond F. Kramer, Buffalo, N.Y., Donald C. Studley, William J. Schramm, Niagara Falls, N.Y., attorneys of record, for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and FISHER, Chief Judge, Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the

  5. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,174 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  6. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)