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Ex Parte Otremba et al

15176952 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2019)
Ex Parte Otremba et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 23 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  2. Gardner v. TEC Systems, Inc.

    725 F.2d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 43 times
    Holding that dependent claims fall with the independent claim on which they depend unless argued separately

  3. Application of Rinehart

    531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 44 times
    Considering the problem to be solved in a determination of obviousness

  4. Application of Aller

    220 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1955)   Cited 46 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding no criticality where claimed conditions allegedly contributed to roughly 20 percentage point improvement in yield

  5. Application of Rice

    341 F.2d 309 (C.C.P.A. 1965)   Cited 2 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7253. February 18, 1965. William T. Sevald, Royal Oak, Mich., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. MARTIN, Judge. The question the court must answer in this appeal is whether appellants' novel air cleaner, as represented by claims 1, 2 and 3 of their application serial No. 816,556 entitled "Air Cleaner" filed on May 28

  6. Application of Dailey

    357 F.2d 669 (C.C.P.A. 1966)

    Patent Appeal No. 7491. March 24, 1966. John Rex Allen, Chicago, Ill. (Richard S. Phillips, Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (J.F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND. Judges. WORLEY, Chief Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals which affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 25-28 in appellants' application for "Nursing Container

  7. Application of Rose

    220 F.2d 459 (C.C.P.A. 1955)   Cited 3 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6080. March 22, 1955. J. Preston Swecker, Washington, D.C. (William L. Mathis, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant. E.L. Reynolds, Washington, D.C. (H.S. Miller, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before GARRETT, Chief Judge, and O'CONNELL, JOHNSON, WORLEY and COLE, Judges. JOHNSON, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the holding of the Primary Examiner rejecting as unpatentable

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,059 times   449 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)