Ex parte Osterberg et al.

15 Cited authorities

  1. WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game Technology

    184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 538 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that district court correctly determined structure was "an algorithm executed by a computer," but "erred by failing to limit the claim to the algorithm disclosed in the specification"
  2. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar

    935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 397 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding construction of § 112, ¶ 1 requires separate written description and enablement requirements
  3. W.L. Gore Associates, Inc. v. Garlock

    721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 327 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court erred by "considering the references in less than their entireties, i.e., in disregarding disclosures in the references that diverge from and teach away from the invention at hand"
  4. In re Kotzab

    217 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 120 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that for a patent to be obvious, "there must be some motivation, suggestion or teaching of the desirability of making the specific combination that was made by the applicant."
  5. In re Dembiczak

    175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 93 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Refusing to consider an obviousness rejection raised for the first time on appeal from the PTO
  6. In re Fine

    837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 69 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing the Board's determination that dependent claims were invalid because "[d]ependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious."
  7. In re Kaslow

    707 F.2d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 75 times
    Holding that prior demonstration of computerized supermarket UPC code system was prior use under meaning of Section 102(b)
  8. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"
  9. In re Dance

    160 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 19 times

    No. 97-1229. October 30, 1998. Grady J. Frenchick, Stroud, Stroud, Willink Thompson Howard, Madison, Wisconsin, argued for appellants Dance, et al. of counsel on the brief was Karen B. King. David J. Ball, Jr., Associate Solicitor, Office of Solicitor, Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. With him on the brief were Nancy J. Linck, Solicitor, Albin F. Drost, Deputy Solicitor, and Scott A. Chambers, Associate Solicitor. Before MAYER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN

  10. In re Rijckaert

    9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 22 times   4 Legal Analyses

    No. 93-1206. November 23, 1993. Edward W. Goodman, North American Philips Corp., of Tarrytown, NY, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Algy Tamoshunas. Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the

  11. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,420 times   1069 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it
  12. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)