Ex Parte Narendra et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 11, 201512868320 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 11, 2015) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/868,320 08/25/2010 Nanjangud C. Narendra IN920100066US1 (790.077) 5649 89885 7590 09/14/2015 FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC 409 BROAD STREET PITTSBURGH, PA 15143 EXAMINER JAMI, HARES ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2162 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/14/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte NANJANGUD C. NARENDRA, KARTHIKEYAN PONNALAGU, BIKRAM SENGUPTA, and RENUKA SINDHGATTA RAJAN ____________ Appeal 2013-007295 Application 12/868,320 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES R. HUGHES, and ERIC S. FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judges. FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2013-007295 Application 12/868,320 2 STATEMENT OF CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–25. Br. 14. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. REJECTIONS The Examiner rejects claims 1–3, 5–7, 11, 13–16, 18–20, and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Srivastava et al. (US 2009/0109225 A1; pub. Apr. 30, 2009) and Chiu et al. (US 6,181,336 B1; issued Jan. 30, 2001). Final Act. 4–8. The Examiner rejects claims 4 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Srivastava, Chiu, and Groeneveld et al. (US 2009/0198667 A1; pub. Aug. 6, 2009). Id. at 8–9. The Examiner rejects claims 8–10 and 21–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Srivastava, Chiu, and Balmin et al. (US 2009/0240682 A1; pub. Sept. 24, 2009). Id. at 9–10. The Examiner rejects claims 12–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Srivastava, Chiu, and Smith (US 2003/0182650 A1; pub. Sept. 25, 2003). Id. at 10–11. The Examiner rejects claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for indefiniteness. Id. at 4. Appeal 2013-007295 Application 12/868,320 3 OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS OF INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 1, 13, AND 14 Appellants address independent claims 1, 13, and 14 collectively. Br. 11–14. The remaining claims depend from claims 1 or 14. Claims 1, 13, and 14 recite similar subject matter, but are respectively directed to a method, apparatus, and computer program product. Exemplary claim 1 is reproduced below. 1. A method of conducting an asset search, said method comprising: executing with one or more processors one or more modules of computer program code configured for receiving an asset model as input; transforming the asset model into an asset tree model, the asset tree model representing at least one version and at least one variant associated with at least one version; accepting an asset search query; parsing the asset search query; said parsing comprising splitting the asset search query into search query components; and conducting an asset search via applying the split asset search query to the asset tree model. Claim 1 principally recites: an asset tree model representing versions and variants; a parsed search query; and a search applying the parsed search query to the asset tree model. Claims 13 and 14 also principally recite these features. Claims 1, 13, and 14 are rejected as obvious of Srivastava and Chiu. The Examiner cites Srivastava as teaching all but the claimed inventions’ implementation of versions and variants. Final Act. 5–6. Bridging this Appeal 2013-007295 Application 12/868,320 4 feature, the Examiner cites Chiu as suggesting modification of Srivastava’s asset tree model to represent versions and variants. Id. at 6. Appellants argue that Srivastava does not apply a parsed search query to an asset tree model. Br. 12. Appellants particularly contend: “To the extent that Srivastava appears to address the handling of a search query of any kind, there appears to be little more undertaken than accepting a natural language search query and then transforming it into machine language.” Id. The argument is not persuasive; particularly insofar that Srivastava teaches tokenizing of the search query and applying of the tokenized search query. Srivastava ¶ 58. The Examiner’s explanation of this teaching is that such tokenizing parses a query into components such as words. Ans. 4–5. Appellants fail to explain why either: Srivastava’s tokenizing would not be understood as parsing the search query; or Srivastava system’s would not be understood as applying a resulting tokenized search query to the asset model. Appellants also argue that Srivastava does not teach an asset tree model representing versions and variants, but rather teaches a nodal structure representing merely assets and artifacts. Br. 12. Appellants explain: “[T]his representation is constructed merely to represent, at a level of fine detail, constituent components of a specific item.” Id. The argument is not persuasive, for each of two reasons. First, the argument fails to present a distinguishing feature of the claimed inventions’ “asset tree model representing at least one version and at least one variant,” much less evidence of such a feature. For example, Appellants do not present a required feature of the asset tree model, much less such a feature distinguishing over a nodal structure. Rather, Appellants Appeal 2013-007295 Application 12/868,320 5 cursorily assert that a tree model is not taught by a nodal structure. A mere allegation of patentable distinction, as here, does not constitute an argument for patentability. Second, the argument fails to address the Examiner’s proposed combination of Srivastava and Chiu. More particularly, the argument alleges that the claimed inventions’ versions and variants distinguish over Srivastava’s assets and artifacts; but the Examiner does not read the claimed inventions’ versions and variants on Srivastava’s assets and artifacts. Rather, the Examiner reads the claimed inventions’ tree model representation of versions and variants on Srivastava’s nodal structure as modified to include versions and variants in view of Chiu. Appellants further argue that Chiu does not teach “asset” versions or asset variants and, thus, Srivastava’s nodal structure would not represent asset versions and variants if modified in view of Chiu. Id. at 13–14. According to Appellants: “assets” are software tools; “versions” are new versions of software tools; and “variants” are customizations of the versions. Id. Appellants contend that Chiu addresses multimedia files; not software tools, much less software tool versions and variants. Id. at 14. The argument is not persuasive, for each of two reasons. First, the Specification does not restrict “assets” to software tools. Rather, the Specification states only that “[a]ssets can be software or other useful computer-based tools[.]” Spec. ¶ 1; see also Chiu, col. 3, ll. 7–24 (defining “asset”). Such an open-ended description of features does not disclaim undescribed features, such as multimedia files. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he PTO should only limit the claim based on the specification . . . when those sources expressly disclaim the Appeal 2013-007295 Application 12/868,320 6 broader definition.”); see also Spec. ¶ 70 (“[E]mbodiments of the invention are not limited to those precise embodiments.”). Second, even assuming arguendo the claimed inventions’ “assets” are restricted to software tools, the argument would nonetheless fail to address Chiu’s organizing via versions and variants. That is, the argument would fail to show Chiu’s organizing of multimedia files by versions/variants does not evidence a predictability of likewise organizing software tools by versions/variants. For the foregoing reasons, Appellants have not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1, 13, and 14. Their rejection is accordingly sustained. OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS OF DEPENDENT CLAIMS 2–12 AND 15–25 Appellants do not assert respective separate bases of patentability for the depending claims; relying solely upon their dependencies from independent claims 1, 13, and 14, addressed above. Br. 14. Accordingly, as the arguments for claims 1, 13, and 14 are not persuasive, the rejections of remaining claims 2–12 and 15–25 are sustained. INDEFINITENESS REJECTION OF CLAIM 2 Claim 2 is rejected for indefiniteness. Appellants do not address the rejection. We accordingly sustain the rejection pro forma. Appeal 2013-007295 Application 12/868,320 7 DECISION For the foregoing reasons, the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1– 25 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED ACP Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation