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Ex Parte Nagghappan

12904286 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2014)
Ex Parte Nagghappan

11 Cited authorities

  1. Cooper v. Goldfarb

    154 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 152 times   18 Legal Analyses
    Holding that inventor's date of reduction to practice requires independent corroboration

  2. In re Robertson

    169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 65 times
    Holding that inherent anticipation requires more than mere probability or possibility that the missing descriptive materials are present in the prior art

  3. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  4. Chester v. Miller

    906 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 19 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 90-1039. June 29, 1990. Marina V. Schneller, Mobil Oil Corp., Fairfax, Va., argued, for appellants. With her on the brief, was Alexander J. McKillop. Thomas G. De Jonghe, Chevron Corp., San Francisco, Cal., argued, for appellees. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Before MICHEL, Circuit Judge, BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WILL, Senior District Judge. The Honorable Hubert L. Will, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

  5. In re Kroekel

    803 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 7 times

    Appeal No. 86-721. October 14, 1986. Michael B. Fein, Rohm and Haas Co., Philadelphia, Pa., argued for appellants. With him on the brief was Carl W. Battle. Also on the brief was Rudolf E. Hutz, Connolly, Bove, Lodge Hutz, Wilmington, Del. Richard E. Schafer, Associate Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol. and Fred E. McKelvey. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, BENNETT, Senior Circuit Judge

  6. Turner v. Enrille

    4 U.S. 7 (1799)   Cited 6 times

    AUGUST TERM, 1799. For the defendant in error, Dallas lamented the obvious irregularities on the face of the record, though the merits were incontestably established in his favour, by the verdict and judgment. He thought, however, that the Court would give every reasonable intendment to the allegations of the record, in support of the judgment and verdict; and, therefore, endeavoured to distinguish the present case from the case of Bingham v. Cabot et al. 3 Dall. Rep. 382. In Bingham v. Cabot et

  7. Glass v. Betsey

    3 U.S. 6 (1794)   Cited 3 times

    FEBRUARY TERM, 1794. For the Appellants, the case was briefly opened, upon the following principles. The question is of great importance; and extends to the whole judicial authority of the United States; for, if the admiralty has no jurisdiction, there can be no jurisdiction in any common law court. Nor is it material to distinguish the ownership of the vessel and cargo; since strangers, or aliens, in amity, are entitled equally with Americans to have their property protected by the laws. Vatt. B

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,154 times   485 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 132 - Notice of rejection; reexamination

    35 U.S.C. § 132   Cited 310 times   47 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting addition of "new matter"

  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)

  11. Section 41.52 - Rehearing

    37 C.F.R. § 41.52   Cited 7 times   9 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) Appellant may file a single request for rehearing within two months of the date of the original decision of the Board. No request for rehearing from a decision on rehearing will be permitted, unless the rehearing decision so modified the original decision as to become, in effect, a new decision, and the Board states that a second request for rehearing would be permitted. The request for rehearing must state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by