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Ex Parte Morita et al

13816206 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2019)
Ex Parte Morita et al

14 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.

    464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 136 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding based on the record that "[t]he presence of certain secondary considerations of nonobviousness are insufficient as a matter of law to overcome our conclusion that the evidence only supports a legal conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious"

  3. In re Huai-Hung Kao

    639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 88 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "food effect" was obvious because the effect was an inherent property of the composition

  4. In re Fulton

    391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 81 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a particular combination" need not "be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation"

  5. In re De Blauwe

    736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the

  6. In re Fracalossi

    681 F.2d 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Addressing whether specific anticipation rejection was sufficient evidentiary support for obviousness rejection

  7. In re Boe

    355 F.2d 961 (C.C.P.A. 1966)   Cited 26 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7535. February 17, 1966. Burgess, Dinklage Sprung, Arnold Sprung, New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. The Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 9, 11 and 12 of appellant's application for patent Serial No. 845,743, filed August 12, 1959, for "Highly Porous And Absorptive

  8. APPLICATION OF SUSI

    440 F.2d 442 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 7 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8392. April 22, 1971. Rehearing Denied June 10, 1971. William Kaufman, Harry H. Kline, Roland A. Dexter, Stamford, Conn., attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. R.E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and NEWMAN Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the

  9. Application of Klosak

    455 F.2d 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 6 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8582. March 9, 1972. Charles W. B. Connors, Chicago, Ill. (Johnston, Root, O'Keeffe, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., son Shurtleff), Chicago, Ill., attorneys E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals

  10. Application of Mills

    470 F.2d 649 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 5 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8796. December 29, 1972. Marion C. Staves, Wilmington, Del., attorney of record, for appellants. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C. Robert D. Edmonds, Oakton, Va., of Counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges. LANE, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals sustaining the examiners's rejection of claims 1-4

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)