Ex Parte Moore et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. Wied v. Valhi, Inc.

    465 U.S. 1026 (1984)   Cited 260 times
    Stating that "[t]o demand a slavish adherence to the procedural sequence and to require these defendants, in this case, to articulate the words of renewal once the motion had been taken under advisement, would be 'to succumb to a nominalism and a rigid trial scenario as equally at variance as ambush with the spirit of the rules.'"
  2. Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

    713 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 111 times
    In Kalman, this court determined that the district court's fact finding of identity of invention (reached after a four day bench trial) was not clearly erroneous, and that "the stipulation by the parties, coupled with [Kimberly Clark's] failure to counter Kalman's affidavits and evidence submitted in his motion for summary judgment" dictated a finding of infringement.
  3. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness
  4. RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc.

    730 F.2d 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that dependent claim "cannot be anticipated" where the independent claim "is not anticipated"
  5. In re Young

    927 F.2d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    Observing that in an obviousness inquiry, courts consider a prior art "reference for what it disclose in relation to the claimed invention."
  6. Application of Johnson

    558 F.2d 1008 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing rejection for inadequate written description where specification disclosed several species of a genus and claims recited genus but excluded two species of lost interference count
  7. Application of Swan Wood

    582 F.2d 638 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 7 times

    Appeal No. 78-518. August 31, 1978. Donald Brown, Robert F. O'Connell, Boston, Mass., Dike, Bronstein, Roberts, Cushman Pfund, Boston, Mass., Attys. of record, for appellants; Martin P. Hoffman, Donald M. Sandler, Arlington, Va., Hoffman Sandler, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN, LANE

  8. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,383 times   1047 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it
  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,141 times   481 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  10. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,010 times   1009 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  11. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)