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Ex Parte Montgomery

13242489 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2018)
Ex Parte Montgomery

11 Cited authorities

  1. Wyers v. Master Lock Co.

    616 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 205 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success exist when "it is simply a matter of common sense" to combine known elements of the prior art to solve a known problem

  2. Tokai Corp v. Easton Enterprises, Inc.

    632 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 147 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that regional circuit law governs the decision to exclude evidence

  3. In re Huai-Hung Kao

    639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 87 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "food effect" was obvious because the effect was an inherent property of the composition

  4. Leapfrog v. Fisher-Price

    485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 90 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the objective considerations of nonobviousness presented, including substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, and long-felt need, were inadequate to overcome a strong showing of primary considerations that rendered the claims at issue invalid

  5. In re Huang

    100 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 91 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the inventor's opinion as to the purchaser's reason for buying the product is insufficient to demonstrate a nexus

  6. In re De Blauwe

    736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the

  7. Application of Fenton

    451 F.2d 640 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 7 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8546. November 11, 1971. Robert E. Strauss, Brea, Cal., attorney of record, for appellant. Milton W. Lee, Brea, Cal., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of United States Patent Office. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,063 times   459 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)