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Ex Parte Meybeck et al

10737897 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 17, 2009)
Ex Parte Meybeck et al

13 Cited authorities

  1. Perricone v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp.

    432 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 147 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a prior-art reference anticipated claims 1-4 and 7, but not claims 8, 9, and 13, because the latter set of claims contained one fewer limitation

  2. In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation

    301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 141 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that preamble was limiting in light of arguments made during prosecution "show[ing] a clear reliance by the patentee on the preamble to persuade the Patent Office that the claimed invention is not anticipated by the prior art"

  3. ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital

    732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 169 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that patent claims "should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity"

  4. In re Omeprazole Patent

    483 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 87 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Stating that an "inequitable conduct claim was not technically moot, because it would have rendered the entire . . . patent unenforceable, rather than just the claims that were held invalid"

  5. MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum

    192 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 108 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding anticipation by inherency of a method of hair depilation

  6. Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.

    342 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 53 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a method of treating ... a male human in need of such treatment means a method practiced for the stated purpose

  7. In re Woodruff

    919 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 58 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding a claimed invention obvious because claimed range (“more than 5% to about 25%” carbon monoxide) abutted range of prior art (“about 1–5%” carbon monoxide)

  8. Whittaker Corp. ex rel. Technibilt Division v. UNR Industries, Inc.

    911 F.2d 709 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 42 times

    No. 89-1420. August 14, 1990. Alex Chartove, Spensley Horn Jubas Lubitz, of Washington, D.C., argued for plaintiff-appellee. W. Thad Adams, III, Spensley Horn Jubas Lubitz, of Washington, D.C., of counsel. John P. Milnamow, Dressler, Goldsmith, Shore, Suther Milnamow, Ltd., of Chicago, Ill., argued for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief was Karl R. Fink. Also on the brief were James W. Clement, Clement Ryan, of Chicago, Ill., and Floyd A. Gibson and Blas P. Arroyo, Bell, Seltzer, Park Gibson

  9. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 29 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate

  10. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  11. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  12. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)