No. 91-1088. March 10, 1993. Jack E. Haken, U.S. Philips Corp., Tarrytown, NY, argued, for appellant. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued, for appellee. With him on the brief, was Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before ARCHER, PLAGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. ARCHER, Circuit Judge. Johannes R. Van Geuns appeals from the September 25, 1990 decision of the Patent and Trademark Office
Patent Appeal No. 7718. January 12, 1967. Charles H. Lauder, St. Paul, Minn., for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (S. William Cochran, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. ALMOND, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims
Patent Appeal No. 6719. July 25, 1962. J. Hart Evans, Louis C. Smith, Jr., New York City, and Paul A. Rose, Washington D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)