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Ex Parte Mena Campos et al

12598084 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 22, 2016)
Ex Parte Mena Campos et al

13 Cited authorities

  1. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck Co.

    722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 262 times
    Finding that the "right to exclude recognized in a patent is the essence of the concept of property"

  2. In re Huai-Hung Kao

    639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 88 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "food effect" was obvious because the effect was an inherent property of the composition

  3. MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum

    192 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 108 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding anticipation by inherency of a method of hair depilation

  4. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter

  5. Yorkey v. Diab

    601 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 29 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Board is "well within its discretion" to give more or less credibility to expert testimony unless "no reasonable trier of fact could have done so"

  6. In re Spada

    911 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 58 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the claims were properly rejected by the PTO because they were anticipated by a prior art reference

  7. In re Fracalossi

    681 F.2d 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Addressing whether specific anticipation rejection was sufficient evidentiary support for obviousness rejection

  8. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,996 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  11. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)