No. 92-1446. December 11, 1995. Harold C. Wegner, Foley Lardner, of Washington, D.C., argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Herbert I. Cantor and Douglas P. Mueller. Of counsel was Don J. Pelto. Fred E. McKelvey, Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee. Nancy J. Linck, Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, Lee E. Barrett, Associate Solicitor, John W. Dewhirst, Associate Solicitor, Albin F. Drost, Deputy Solicitor and Richard E. Schafer, Associate Solicitor
Patent Appeal No. 7822. June 29, 1967. Richard E. Warner, for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. SMITH, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of the appealed claims under 35 U
Patent Appeal No. 6709. May 4, 1962. Frederick J. Olsson, Synnestvedt Lechner, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for Commissioner of Patents. [Oral argument October 9, 1961, by Mr. Olsson and Mr. Nakamura] Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Associate Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate
Patent Appeal No. 76-561. July 22, 1976. Charles L. Gholz, Sughrue, Rothwell, Mion, Zinn Macpeak, Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, John W. Dewhirst, Joseph T. Zatarga, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeal. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, LANE and MILLER, Judges, and ALMOND, Senior Judge. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)