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Ex Parte McKay et al

11968923 (P.T.A.B. May. 31, 2018)
Ex Parte McKay et al

7 Cited authorities

  1. Bilski v. Kappos

    561 U.S. 593 (2010)   Cited 807 times   158 Legal Analyses
    Holding claims directed to hedging risk ineligible

  2. Gottschalk v. Benson

    409 U.S. 63 (1972)   Cited 498 times   59 Legal Analyses
    Holding claim involving mathematical formula invalid under § 101 that did not preempt a mathematical formula

  3. Cybersource Corp.. v. Retail Decisions Inc.

    654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 278 times   22 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a claim whose "steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper" is directed to an "unpatentable mental process"

  4. In re Bilski

    545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 270 times   40 Legal Analyses
    Holding that non-preemption under the second step of what was then called the "Freeman –Walter –Abele test" requires that the claim be "tied to a particular machine or bring about a particular transformation of a particular article"

  5. Section 101 - Inventions patentable

    35 U.S.C. § 101   Cited 3,420 times   2200 Legal Analyses
    Defining patentable subject matter as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."

  6. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  7. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)